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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound
interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected
Legal Essays, p. 269.
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-VENUE-JURISDICTION BY CONSENT OF
PARTIES. State v. Phillips., Criminal prosecution was commenced against
one Phillips in the circuit court of Miller County. Upon his application in due
form, the venue was ordered changed to the circuit court of Morgan County.
Through error, the papers in the cause were sent to the circuit court of Moni-
teau County. The parties appeared and made no objection to the jurisdiction
of that court; trial was had resulting in the conviction of the defendant and he
appealed, raising for the first time in the appellate court, the question of the
jurisdiction of the circuit court of Moniteau County. The cause was reversed
by the Kansas City Court of Appeals for want of jurisdiction in the trial
court, and was remanded with directions to transfer the papers to the circuit
court of Morgan County for new trial, the court saying: "The circuit court
of Moniteau County had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction
over the subject matter cannot be waived or given even by consent." (Our
Italics).
By jurisdiction is meant the legal power 2 of a tribunal to make an order
or render a judgment of a specific kind in a given case,' thus changing existing
1. (1924) 261 S. NV. 713. judgment only. But of course a court may
2. For a definition of legal power in the sometimes have the power to make an order
sense here used, see Hohfeld, Fundamental of some kind in a case in which it does not
Legal Conceptions 4s dpplied In Judicial have power to render judgment, t. g. In the
Reasoning, (1923) pp. 50 etseq. case under review the court was directed to
3. In the present discussion the word will send the papers in the cause to the circuit
be used as meaning power to render a final court of Morgan county.
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jural relationships between parties before it.' This jural power like all other
juristic relationships is created by the action of a rule of laws upon certain
operative facts.6 The rules of law which determine what operative facts must
be present in a given case before the court will possess legal power to render a
judgment are the rules of the competence of the court.7 Subject to limitations,
if any there be, imposed by a superior federal constitutionalsor international
law,9 these rules of competence are to be found in the law, constitutional,
statutory, or judicial, of the court's own state10 and suchlaw may prescribe any
rule of competence by the lawmaker deemed desirable.
Unddr certain circumstances where one of the operative facts necessary
to conferjurisdiction of a cause upon a given court is absent, the presence of an
:additional fact, that of consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the parties
litigant, will under existing rules of competence suffice to vest the court with
-power to adjudicate the controversy. 1 Under other circumstances, absent one
of such necessary jurisdictional facts required by the ordinary rules of com-
petence, consent will not be held to supply the lack.u It is often said that
consent of the parties will confer jurisdiction of the person but not of the
subject matter. 13 This statement does not solve the present problem as it only
raises further questions: What is jurisdiction of the subject matter, and what
is jurisdiction of the person? Owing to the shifting meanings attached to
these terms in the decisions of the Missouri courts,1' it would seem that to dis-
4. See Barnett, 4 Definition Of Jurisdic-
tion, (1914) 47 Am. Law Rev. 518, and in
particular, p. 525; McBaine, The Extraordi-
nary Writ of Prohibition in Mirsouri, (1924)
30 Law Ser. University M o. Bull. 25, et Leq.,
where a number of definitions are collected;
Cooper v. Rynolds (1870) 10 Wall. 308, 19
L. Ed. 931; Msunday v. Fail (1871) 34 N. J.
Law418.
5. Hohfeld, Op. Ci1. p. 32.
6. Operative facts are sometimes called
constitutive facts or facta probanda. They
are the facts because of whose existance law
creates a legal right or other legal relationship
between parties concerned. Ilohfeld, Op.
Cit. p. 32; Wigmore, (1924) Evidence
(2nd Ed.) sec. 2.
7. Calvo, Dictionaire du Droit Interna-
tional (1895) Tit. Competence, p. 161: "This
word designates in general, the measure of
power imparted by the law to each public
official, in a more restricted sense, the power
which the law gives the judge to perform his
offices within the limits which it points out.
Jurisdiction is the power of the judge and
competence is the measure of jurisdiction."
(Our translation.)
8. Such as found e. g. in the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Pennoyer v. Neff (1877)
95 U. S. 714,24 L. Ed. 56S.
9. That there may be such limitations,
see Beale, Jurisdiction of Courts orer For-
eignerr, (1912) 26 Harv. Law Rev. 193, 283.
10. Beale, 26 Harv. Law Rev. 193, 283.
11. See15C.J.808, n.57.
12. 15 C. J. 802, n. 6.
13. 15 C. J. 802r tste. See the discussion
in Hadley v. Bernero (1903) 103 Mo. App.
549, 78 S. W. 64.
14. The use of the terms in the folloring
cases is very confusing: State r. Phillips.
note 1, jupra; Cole r. Norton (1923) 251
S. W. 723; Title Guararty a. Drtncon (1918)
208 S. IV. 474; Hfenderson r. e r.dtron
(1874) 55 AMo. 534; Snitirr r. Downing (1883)
80 Mo. 586; Bray v. Marshall (1877) 66 Mo.
122.
On the other hand, very careful and scien-
tific definitions of the terms will be found in
the following cscs: Ulird a. Papis (1847)
11 Mo. 42; Chouteau a. Allen (1879) 70 Mo.
290 1. c. 353; Poithlewaite a. Ghielin (1888)
97 Mo. 420, 10 S. IV. 482; State ex rt). Sect
v. Smith (1891) 104 Mo. 421. 16 S. IV. 41S;
Hadley v. Berrero. upra. B. g. Barclay, J.
in Pothekleaitei' case, supra, p. 424: "The
circuit court at the time certainly had
jurisdiction of the subject matter * * * by
which is meant that that court bad juris.
diction of causes of the gereral elas to Lrhir
that action belonged." (Italics ours.) Wilti ,.
Subject-Mater. (1909) 9 CoL Law Rev. 419.
and 423: "In positive law. subject matter'
is the term used to denote the content-that
is, the subjects or matters presented for
consideration-of either the whole of the
law or by some particular part of it, and
these are always legal rights". "A court is
said to have 'jurisdiction over the subject-
matter' when it has power to hear, try and
determine some right, not in a particular
case but in every case of that class."
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI- BULLETIN
pense with them as far as possible for the purpose of the present discussion
would lead to greater clarity of thinking. The solution of the problem can
best be approached by a purely inductive study of the actual phenomena of
existing law as disclosed by the exact facts of reported cases. The object of
such inductive study is to determine the precise kind of cases in which,'consent
of the parties will be held to confer jurisdiction otherwise lacking,
Under existing jurisprudence, one of the necessary jurisdictional elements
which is in many instances required (in the first instance before consent of the
parties has raised any question of waiver) is that of venue.'0 By this is meant
that the case must be brought before the courts of some particular local
civil subdivision of the state, e. g. in some county. Thus, it may be required
that the action be brought where the cause of action arose," where the rer
concerned is situated,27 or where the plaintiff's or defendant"q resides. In the
case under review, it is this element of venue, the absence of which the parties
sought to supply by their consent, 20 and the problem raised by the case is
that of determining whether this situation is to be classified with those in
which ajurisdictional element can be so supplied or with those in which waiver
by the parties is denied such effect.
In civil cases dealing with jurisdiction conferred by consent great con-
trariety of opinion is found in the decisions of the Missouri courts. The result
of the decisions seems to be about as follows:-In personal injury and personal
property cases, 21 actions ex contractu,22 and other actions of similar nature
where the action is brought in the wrong county, and both parties appear and
go to trial (thus consenting to jurisdiction or waiving the want of jurisdiction,
15. As will be shown later, these rules of
venue are historically connected with the
origin of the jury system but today, they
are found in all of the statutory systems of
civil and criminal procedure in our states,
although in England under the Judicature
Acts, they have ceased to exist. CL R. S. Mo.
(1919) Chap. 12, Art Ill with 36-37 Vict. c. 66
(1878) and order XXXVI made in accordance
therewith. See Companhia de Mocambique P.
British South Africa Co. (1892) 2 Q. B. 358,
61 L. J. Q. B. 663, 66 L. T. R. (N. S.) 773
and same case (1893) A. C. 602.
16. E. g. in criminal cases, Constitution
of Missouri, Art. II, Sec. 22; R. S. Mo. 1919,
Chap. 25, Art I, Constitution of the United
States, 6th Amendment. In cases brought
against corporations, R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec.
1180.
17. E. g. actions concerning land, R. S.
Mo. 1919, Sec. 1179.
18. E. g. divorce actions, R. S. Mo. 1919,
Sec. 1802.
19. R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 1177.
20. If we look at the actual facts of the
case under review, we can discover a possible
line of distinction between it and cases in
which proceedings have originally been
brought in the wrong county and this defect
waived by consent. The distinction is that
here we have the circuit court of Miller
county having complete jurisdiction of a
cause and there at first glance seems some
necessity to get rid of this jurisdiction before
the circuit court of Moniteau could acquire
any. This difference is more seeming than
real. It proceeds from faulty analysis and in
particular from the fact that we have been In
the habit of thinking of jurisdiction as a
kind of metaphysical entity-4a sort of
possession of a case or seisin of a case --
which can and in fact must be handed on
from one court to anotherjust as selsin of land
passed from one owner to another. If we look
on it as a mere jural power to do a certain par-
ticular thing in relation to A case, this diflculty
disappears to a large extent. Still a question
of policy arises as to whether cases should be
thus transferred from court to court without
the permission of the judge. But here an
order of the judge changing the venue had
already been made. All of the counties
involved were in the same circuit and it
would therefore seem that there was at
least an implied assent of the circuit judge.
21. Bomrr v. R. R. Co. (1911) 152
Mo. App. 357, 133 S. IV. 106, Julian v.
Kanra, City Star (1907) 209 Mo. 35, 107
S. W. 496. Cf. Taylor v. R. R. Co. (1878)
68 Mo. 397, remblr, action of trespass
quart claurumfrtgit.
22. Scott v. Riddli (1900) 84 Mo. App.
275; Ripprtrin v. In,. Co. (1874) 57 Mo, 86.
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both forms of expression being used interchangably), the court has jurisdiction
to render a valid judgment. Consent, the courts say, confers jurisdictionza
In equity cases, likewise, even where the title to real estate is involved, de-
fects of venue may be waived by consent of the parties.2 But it is otherwise
in the case of common law actions involving the title to land. s Upon this
last proposition, however, some recent dicta look the other way.26 In divorce
cases, the law is not well settled but it has been said that local venue may be
waived.27
The Missouri rule in regard to ordinary personal actions is in accord with
the holdings in practically all American states. 8 The decisions in regard to
cases at common law regarding land are, however, radically out of harmony
with the great weight of common law authority.2
In criminal cases, applicable authorities are few. The instant case seems
to follow pretty closely the ruling of the Supreme Court in State V. Buck,30
although that case is not cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its deci-
sion. In Buck's case, a change of venue was taken in one of several companion
cases* and the papers in the other cases were sent to the court to which the
first vias referred. No order had been made in any of these latter cases. The
parties appeared and went to trial without jurisdictional objection. It was
held that their consent did not avail to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court
in the cases in which no order for change of venue had been made. There are a
few decisions in other states in accord with the rule expressed in the Buck
case and that under review.31 On the other hand, the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the recent case of Cole u. United States,'
expressly holds that a defect in venue in a criminal case may be waived by
23. As to what constitutes such waiver by
appearance, see 4 C. J. 1229; Fedler r.
-Schroeder (1875) 59 Mo. 364; Baisley r. Baisley
(1892) 113 Mo. 544,21 S. W. 29.
24. Chouteau v. Allen (1879) 70 Mo. 290
1. c. 353 (foreclosure); Ulrici v. Papin (1847)
11 Mo. 42; Real Estate Co. v. Lindell (1895)
133 Mo. 386, 1. c. 395, 33 S. W. 466 (fraudu-
lent conveyance); Johnson v. Detrick (1899)
152 Mo. 243,53 S. W. 891, semble (partition).
2S. Snitfer v. Downing (1883) 80 Mo.
586; Henderson v. Henderson (1874) S5
Mlo. 534; Bray v. Marshall (1877) 66 Mo. 122.
26. Rodney v. Gibbs (1904) 184 Mo. 1, 82
S. W. 187; Sterns v. R. R. Co. (1887) 94
Mo. 317, 7 S. W. 27t (equity suit).
27. See the remarks of Woodson, 3.,
in his dissenting opinion in Dorrance a.
Dorrance (1912) 242 Mo. 625, at 662, 148
S.W.94.
8. Nelson-v. East Side Grocery Co. (1915)
26 Cal. App. 344, 146 Pac. 1055; R. R. Co. a.
Suddeth (1890) 86 Ga. 388, 12 S. E. 682;
R. A_ Co. v. Soloman (1864) 23 Ind. 534;
W~hite v. R. R. Co. (1903) 25 Utah 346, 71
Pac. 593; Smith v. Morrill (1898) 12 Col.
App. 233, 55 Pac. 824; Richardson v. R. R.
Co. (1908) 129 Ky. 449, 112 S. W. 582;
Pollard v. D:bight (1808) 4 Cranch 421, 2
L. Ed. 666; R. R. Co. v. McBride (1891)
141 U. S. 127, 11 Sup. CL 982, 3S L Ed.
659; Atlantic Corporation v. U. S. Shipoing
Board (1923) 286 Fed. 222.
29. Norton'rs Afd a. Mark/btry (1887)
9 Ky. Law Rep. 424, 5 S. WV. 482; State r.
Patterson (1897) 17 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 42
S. W. 369; Woll a. McCough (1911) 175 Ala.
297, 57 So. 754. There are numemus equity
cases following the same rule as applied in the
Missouri cases, jupra note 24, see e. g.
Fletcher a. Stowell (1891) 17 Col. 94, 28 Pac.
326. In California, the rules of venue in
local cases depend upon the constitution
and upon that ground the courts hold that
questions of local venue are jurisdictionaL
Herd v. Tuohy (1901) 133 Cal. 55. 65 Pac.
139, a decision which is dearly erroneous
since, if this reasoning is adopted, all change
of venue statutes in land and criminal cases,
depending upon waiver of constitutional
rights by the parties, would be unconstit-
ti~nal.
30. (1893) 120 Mo. 479,25 S. V. 573, and
(1891) 108 Mo. 622, 18 S. W. 1113.
31. Fawcett a. State (1850) 71 Ind. 590,
595.
32. (1924) 298 Fed. 86, 88. This was a
contempt case but under the Clayton Act.
the rules of criminal procedure were appli-
cable.
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consent of the parties. And there are a few state decisions which seem to
support this rule."3 On change of venue where an order of the court of original
jurisdiction changing the venue has actually been made, the Missouri courts
seem to hold that even the gravest irregularities in the proceedings leading up,
to such order are cured by the appearance and consent of the parties.Y4
Thus there are in this state, only two classes of cases, actions at common
law involving the title to land and criminal cases, in which defects of venue
may not be waived. In these two classes, there seems to be only one factor in
common, which is uniformly absent of personal tort, contract actions and
suits in equity. This is their common historical classification as "local actions".
The fact that the rule here adopted in criminal cases is followed in some other
states in civil penal actions affords added proof of this conclusion. It is there-
fore necessary to notice the historical origin of the distinction between local
and transitory actions35 and of the rules of venue in the former.
In the early formative period of our law the jury were not triers of the fact
but rather official witnesses who decided the case not from the evidence
furnished them by others but from their own personal independent knowledge
of the facts in controversy.3 6 It was therefore necessary that the jurors should
be summoned from the place where the facts occurred or existed, since such
jurors alone could have sufficient personal knowledge to reach an intelligent
decision.37 Where part of the facts of a case were foreign, since no jurors
could be summoned from outside the realm, no trial at all was possible. The
obvious hardship of this rule was felt first and most severely in cases of i
commercial nature. It was therefore in actions ex contracIu3" that a way out
was first found through the adoption of a fiction, viz. that of pleading the
foreign facts with a fictitious English venue. 39 As these allegations of venue
could not be denied by the defendant, under the rules of the court, the case
would proceed to trial as if it had actually occurred in England.40 In ration-
alizing this process the courts said that the venue was not really material in
these cases and therefore could not be traversed as only material allegations
could be traversed. The courts argued in a circle as follows: the facts are
not issuable because not material; they are not material because the action is
transitory; the action is transitory because the allegations of venue are not
issuable. Because of the fact that through other reasons of policy the courts
33. Lightfoot v. Commonwealth (1882) 38. Y. B. 48 Edw. 111. Hil. Pl. 6; Y. B.
80 Ky. 516,522. 20 Hen. VI. Pas. Pl. 21; Y. B. 32 Hen. VI
34. State v. Knight (1875) 61 Mo. 373. Hil. Pl. 13. See Holdsworth, The Rules of
35. See the discussion by Hepburn in Fenue and the Beginning of the Commercial
Cyc. I t seq. Jurirdiction of the Common Lauw Courts (1914)
36. See 11 Pollock and Maitland, History 14 Col. Law Rev. 551.
of the English Law (1895) 619; Thayer, 39. See in particular Y. B. 48 Edw. III,
The jury and its Development (1895), note 38, supra, and compare the discussion
5 Harv. Law Rev. 249, 295, 357. Wigmore, in Companiha Mochambique v. British
Evidence (2nd Ed.) (1924) sec. 1800. South Africa Co,, note 15, supra.
37. Bracton, De Legibus (circa 1216) f. 40. 2 Blackstone, Comm. (Chitty's
309 b., 316, and 319b. For the importanceof Ed.) 228. See 40 Cyc. 22, and 14 Col. Law
the change from "fact" venue to "action" Rev. 551.
venue in this movement, see 40 Cyc. I t seq.
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did not want to assume jurisdiction of landst and criminal casest1 arising out
of England, and the further fact that in the history of the jury system no
distinction between the cases of foreign origin and questions of merely local
venue was made, 0 the fiction was not allowed in either of these last two classes
of actions. As the Court of Chancery was a single centralized tribunal sitting
for the most part in London, the rules of local venue were therefore impossible
of application there. Moreover, the jury never was used in chancery, except
in a few special cases and as a mere advisory body to the court, and hence
the rules growing out of the history of the jury system had no place there.
Thus, if we regard the history of the rules of local venue, we see that they
-were founded upori the notion of the jurors as witnesses in the case-a notion
-which of course has no place in our modern system of trial by an impartial
tribunal upon the testimony of witnesses subject to cross-examination. This
being true, the distinction between real and personal actions, upon which the
Missouri rule in regard to waiving venue in criminal and land cases is based, is
seen to be without real foundation. But in criminal cases there are reasons of
public policy, rarely expressed in judicial opinions indeed, but probably present
in the back of the judicial consciousness, which have caused the old rules of
local venue to persist and have led our constitution makers to include them in
the fundamental law. Such are purely practical considerations. It is easier to
get witnesses for both state and defense when the trial takes place at the scene
of the alleged offense. Therefore, such a place of trial tends to a greater degree
of accuracy in the result of the judicial proceedings. Expense is saved and the
burden of the necessary expense incurred is placed upon those who are most
benefited by the prosecution. The effect of punishment as a deterrent to
future crimes is enhanced if that punishment occurs near the scene of the
crime. However it may be said that the right to a trial at the place of the
crime, resting as it does upon practical advantages, may be waived by the
:persons concerned, the state and the accused. In fact, the allowance of change
41. 26 Harv. Law Rev. 193 and 283.
The reasons for this policy are found in the
viatural hesitation of one sovereign to adjudi-
cate concerning the title to lands held
from another sovereign. The control of
and goes, it is thought, to the essence of
sovereignty and any such interference would
be highly impolitic and would violate the
principle of equality of states.
42. Our own courts and legislature have
universally assumed, at least until very recent
times, that criminal acts committed in a
foreign state had such an immediate con-
nection with the sovereignty and public
policy of that state, that they ought not to
be punished except at the place where they
were committed. Certainly the state where
the act is committed ought not to be ousted
of its jurisdiction but, if it fails to assume
jurisdiction and punish the crime, it would
seem that its public policy would not he
adversly affected by a prosecution elsewhere,
as at the domicile of the criminal or the
place of his allegiance. This latter v.iew seems
general with the courts of continental Europe.
See the decision of the Rumanian Court of
CassationinSI Clunet 1133 (1924) and also a
Greek case, S1 Clunet 1120 (1924). In our
own jurisprudence there are signs that this
European view is no longer regarded with
the same degree of disfavor which formerly
prevailed. Statutes allowing the prosecution
of a thief, who has brought stolen goods into
the State, present an example of this tenden-
cy.
43 As shown, the reason for the origi-
nal rules of -fact" venue was the fact that
the juror-witnesses or recognitors must
come from the vicinage. This, of course,
prevented the consideration in England of
cases from beyond the seas. In later times,
the courts attempting to rationalize these
rules sought to explain them by inventing
the doctrine in criminal and land cases ex-
plained above.
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of venue, in spite of the constitutional provisions for a trial at the vicinage,
rests clearly upon such a waiver. 44
Thus from the standpoint of both history and policy, the rule that defects
in venue in criminal and land cases cannot be waived is unjustifiable. It may,
however, be urged in support of the actual decision of the court in the case
under review, as distinguished from the reasoning about jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that the right of the state, in criminal causes to a trial at the
place of the crime is of such paramount importance because of the reasons of
policy above outlined that the prosecuting attorney ought not to be allowed to
waive it except within the exact scope of the change of venue statutes. The
question is one of balancing the interests thus protected .with the social in-
terest in speedy justice in cases like that under review.45 To the writer the
balance of convenience seems to be strongly against the rule of the Phillips case.
The statement of the learned court, that the case was one of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and that in the nature of things such jurisdiction
could never be acquired by consent or waiver, seems out of harmony with
those fundamental principles heretofore pointed out and may prove a source of
future difficulties. In fact, some of the troubles inherent in this view of juris-
diction are seen in some recent cases in the same court cited by it in support of
the decision.
In Cole v. Norton" the action was for personal injuries. From the assign-
ment division of the Jackson County circuit court, it was sent to division 6.
The judge in this last division, thereafter, made an order transferring the
cause "by agreement to judges" to division 2. Thereafter, the judge in division
6 made a further order restoring the case to the general docket i. e. sending it
back to division 1., which immediately reassigned the case to division 3.
The parties appeared in this latter division and went to trial without juris-
dictional objection. The court held that division 3 never had jurisdiction
of the subject matter and therefore reversed the case. Another case of almost
identical facts is, Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Drennon.50 In none of the
three cases, it is submitted, was there any real question ofjurisdiction over the
"subject matter," i. e. over the class of cases involved. With due defference
to the learned court, the decisions in all three cases are, we believe, wrong, but
the application of the court's theory of jurisdiction in the last two mentioned is
productive of far more social evil than that in the former. All three seem to
proceed upon an incorrect analysis of the jural concept of jurisdiction.
BEN Ei.y, JR. 48
EVIDENCE-"TIME BOOK" AS REFRESHING RECOLLECTION
-AS EVIDENCE TO GO TO JURY. Mueller v.Rock., This was an action
for work and labor performed. Plaintiff was employed as a carpenter by de-
44. For a good criticism of the theory of 46. (1923) 25i S. W. 723 (K. C. Ct. of
criminal venue, see Stephen, History of the App.)
Criminal Law 276 t seq. For an example of 47. (1918) 208 S. W. 474 (K. C. Ct. of
the persistence of the old ideas long after the App.)
historical conditions out of which they sprang 48. LL. B., U. of Mo. School of Law, 1922,
had disappeared, see the reasoning of the and now a member of the Marion County
Kansas City Court of Appeals in In Re Bar.
McDonald (1885) 19 Mo. App. 370.
45. Pound, Introduction to Legal Philoso. 1. 249 S. W. 435.
phy (1922) 98, 99.
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fendant at 65c per hour. The work was done at intermittent periods and as
plaintiff worked he kept a record of time worked on slips of paper which he
copied into his "time book", sometimes weekly, sometimes daily. About 365
hours of labor was expended. The original slips were inadvertently lost before
litigation was contemplated, and the "time book" constituted plaintiff's
only evidence of the amount of time. At the trial an objection to plaintiff's
use of the "time book" for purpose of "refreshing his memory" was sustain-
ed. Trial court also refused to allow "time book" to be offered in evidence.
Plaintiff had no independent recollection of the number of hours.
The case came before the St. Louis Court of Appeals and an opinion
was rendered by Daues, J. This court was of opinion that the "time book"
should have been admitted in evidence, and also that plaintiff should have
been permitted to "refresh his memory" from it while testifying.
No objection is found in the result of the decision. However, the basis
upon which the court proceeded is not clear. The danger in such cases is that a
great many different principles are liable to be confused. Among these is the
hearsay exception of regular entries in the course of business; also the hearsay
exception of "parties' account books"; and further, the entirely distinct
principles of using a memorandum to "refresh the memory" of a witness, and
using a memorandum as evidence to go to the jury, aptly phrased by Mr.
Wigniore as "past recollection recorded."-
An analysis of the case under review shows that the "time book" cannot
fall under the "regular entry" exception. This exception covers situations
where the bookkeeping is done by a shopkeeper acting as his own clerk or by
one or more clerks, the entrant being now unavailable because of death,
insanity, absence from jurisdiction, or unavailable because of commercial
inconvenience. 3
The principal case may come under the "parties account book" exception,
This exception arose in America, at least, because of the interest disqualifica-
tion, and the purpose was to admit the shop-books of the small shop keeper
who kept no clerks, but did his own book-keeping.' The scope of the exception
as indicated by the English statute of 16095 includes the books of "divers men
of trade and handicraftmen keeping shop-books." But the matter recorded, to
2. Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd Ed., section
734.
3. For cases of regular entries in the
course of business by a deceased person, see:
Nelson v. Nelson (1886) 90 Mfo. 460, 2 S. NV.
413 (record of advancements to children);
Fulkerson v. Long (1895) 63 Mfo. App. 268
(stub of check book); Bader v. Schult & Co.
(1906) 118 Mfo. App. 22, 94 S. NV. 834
(mercantile establishment); In re Green-
wood's Estate (1919) 201 Mo. App. 39, 208
S. W. 635 (private account book).
For cases admitting books without any
clear and definite theory see: Mfissouri
Electric Light & Power Co. v. Carmody (1897)
72 Mo. App. 534 (no showing whether all
entrants available; argument whether book
of original entry); Gubernaor v. Rettalack
(1900) 86 Mo. App. 184 (entrant was
defendant testified concerning entry); Jones-
horo. L. C. & E. R. Co. r. Urited Iron
Works (1905) 117 Mo. App. 153.94 S. W. 726
(time slips made by workmen in shop; no
showing as to entrants being available);
Robinson e. Smith (1892) 111 Mo. 205, 20
S. W. 29 (ledger, cash book, balance book
of bank admissible; no showing as to entrants)
drery e. Tucker (1909) 137 Mo. App.428,
118 S. IV. 672 (books of milling company;
entrant unaccounted for); Jrthr Mt lling
Co. r. IWalsh (1891) 108 Mo. 277, 19
S. W. 904 (entries in regular course but
apparently no recognition of any necessity
principle); Sch=wl r. 2fifing Co. (1916)
195 Mo. App. 89 190 S. W. 959 (comes under
the exception for entries in the regular course
of business).
4. Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd Ed., sec-
tions 1074, 1518.
5. 7 James. lc. 12.
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come within the exception, must be "proper and usual subject of charge on
books of account".6 Even though the exception was not recognized in Missouri
prior to 1865 and even though there may be some doubt as to the entries
being contemporaneous with the events, the case under review may be
classified as a "shop-book" case.
Upon what other basis can the case be justified? The Court of Appeals
said that the "time book" could come in as evidence, and also that the witness
should have been allowed to "refresh his memory" from it. These two propo-
sitions, "refreshing memory" and "past recollection recorded," will, for sake of
clarity, be handled separately. They are distinct principles and much confu-
sion and misunderstanding has been caused by not recognizing the distinction.
Let us first take "past recollection recorded" (the memorandum as
evidence). There are many situations where a witness has no distinct present
memory of a transaction once observed, but he has a memorandum of the
transaction made at the time. He can testify that the memorandum is a
correct account of it, even if he is lacking in a present recollection of the facts
recorded.7 The case under review falls in this situation. The witness made
the memorandum as he worked and since the work extended over some time,
it is impossible that he should independently remember the specific days,
their number, and the number of hours worked on each, there being, all told,
some 365 hours.
Now courts allow such memorandum to come in as evidence to go to the
jury. There are some prerequisites to be shown, however, before it is admissi-
ble. First, it is necessary to show the transaction was correctly recorded,'
either by the witness himself,9 or under his direction or with his approval at the
time,10 while the transaction was "fairly fresh" in the mind of the witness."
The original must be produced in court or accounted for.ii Moreover, the
opponent is allowed to inspect the memorandum and use it to cross-examine
6. R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 5411. See statute
interpreted in Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh,
Jones (1903) 101 Mo. App. 270, 73 S. W. 899
(payments on note not proper subject of
book account).
7. Eberson v. Investment Co. (1908) 130
Mo. App. 296, 109 S. W. 62; State v. Patton
(1914) 255 Mo. 245, 164 S. W. 223; Mathias v.
O'Neill (1887) 94 Mo. 520, 6 S. IV. 253
(case of past recollection even though the
term is not used). Faris, J. in the Patton case
does not approve of part of the opinion by
Goode, J. in the Eberson case dealing with a
certain aspect of present recollection.
8. Eberson v. Invejtmtnt Co. cited note 7
supra.
• 9. Eberson v. Investment Co., cited note 7
supra.
10. Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh, cited
note 3 supra ("made by him or under his
eye"). Perhaps the most satisfactory way to
explain this decision is on the theory of
"composite past recollection."
11. Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd. Ed., section
745, suggests the phrase "fairly fresh"
as being more desirable than the more rigid
tests of "contemporaneousness", "at the
time," etc. Missouri cases use the following
phrases: Eberson v. Inettment Co. cited on
note 7 supra, "while he knew them, made or
verified a record of them;" Borgey, lanvii-
ment Co. v. Yeltt (1897) 142 Mo. 560, 44
S. W. 754, "contemporaneous with the fact";
Gentry v. S. A. Rider Jewelry Co. (1917)
194 S. W. 1057, "contemporaneous with the
transactions recorded"; Wells v. llobison
(1901) 91 Mo. App. 379, "contemporaneous
with the transaction"; Shephard v. People's
Storage V Transfer Co. (1922) 243 S. W. 193.
"contemporaneous with event."
12. llolffo. Matthews (1889) 39 Mo. App.
376; Cozen, o. Barrett (1856) 23 Mo. 544:
Smith v. Beattie (1874) 57 Mo. 281; IWilcoxion
v. Darr (1897) 139 Mo. 660, 41 S. W. 227;
Stephen v. Afetzgtr (1902) 95 Mo. App. 609.
69 S. V. 625; Gardner v. Springfield Gas
Electric Co. (1911) 154 Mo. App. 666, 135
S. W. 1023.
Carbon copies are originals: Ltithtn P.
Braztlle (1912) 164 Mo. App. 415, 144 S. W.
893 (dictum);Hay v. A4merican Fire Clay Co.
(1913) 179 Mo. App. 567, 162 S. W. 666.
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the witness offering it.13 The copy may be made by another person as copyist.
Then we have composite past recollection.14 Both parties take the stand.15
The original writer testifies to the correctness of the original, and the copyist
testifies to the correctness of the copy.
Applying the above principles to the case under review, we find it is
entirely congruous. The witness was on the stand and could testify that the
memorandum was made while the matter was "fairly fresh" (daily) in his
memory; that it was accurately recorded, accurately copied, and the original
inadvertently destroyed. Hence it is submitted that an entirely proper result
was reached upon that point.
We now come to the question of "refreshing his memory" from the "time
book". On principle it seems that when a witness' mind is hazy concerning
some transaction, it could be refreshed by a writing as well as by leading
and suggestive questions, and such principle has been fully recognized. 1
However, if the refreshing of his memory by the writing is artificial and
merely puts a story in the witness' mouth? it should not be allowed. The
true test should be: does the memorandum or writing actually aid the memory
and recall the facts that have now become indistinct by time?' a The applica
tion of such a test is no doubt difficult and much should be left to the discre-
tion of the trial judge. Any writing might be objectionable, and any might
not, depending on the circumstances of the particular case that are not readily
reviewable on appeal.19
But to protect the principle and prevent abuse, a few requirements
have been laid down as requisite before the memorandum will be permitted
to be used. It is held that the witness must have a memory of his own as to
the specific facts independent of the memorandum. -o That is, the witness
must have a recollection that is merely hazy and incomplete. Where the
13. Wigmore, 2nd Ed., Sec. 753; Jbel v.
Strimple (1888) 31 Mo. App. 86, seems to be a
case of present recollection.
14. Stephan v. -.ezger, note 12 supra is an
example even though the term is not used.
15. WVigmore, 2nd Ed., Sec. 750.
16. See numerous cases cited in notes
post. See also IYard v. Transfer & Storage Co.
(1906) 119 Mo. App. 83, 91, 95 S. W. 964
("it is of no consequence .... what circum-
stance, or train of circumstances brought
about a recollection.") A very liberal and
refreshing pointofview byEllison,J.
17. For example, see Steffens V. Bauer
(1879) 70 Mfo. 399 (past recollection, if
anything); Star. Randolph (1916) 186 S. W.
590; Clymer v. K. C. Rys. Co. (1919) 214
S. W. 423: "There was no need to refresh
the witness' recollection as he showed no
failure in that regard .... The method of
using aids to refresh the recollection of a
witness should not be used to substitute
matter contained in the report for the witness'
evidence as to what occurred;" Eberson v.
Investment Co. note 7 spra, "a rehearsal by
the witness of what the appraisers had
done" (as recorded in the memoranda witness
was using); State v. Patton (1913) 255 Mo.
245, 164 S. W. 223. Compare Gas: r. United
Rys. Co. (1920) 232 S. IW 161.
18. Ebrion v. Ir.r:te trJ Co., note 7
supra. "The essential fact is that after
looking at it, the witness has a present memo-
ry of the facts." For a case where there was a
refreshing, see: Stai e. dbel (1877) 6S Mlo.
357; also the following cases where testimony
before a grand jury was used to reresh
witnes' memory at the trial: State r. Dr
Priest (1921) 288 Mo. 4S9, 232 S. W. 83;
Statt v. Miller (1911) 234 Mo. 588, 137
S. W. 887; Statev. Riles (1918) 274 Mo. 618.
204 S. IV. 1. For comments on the restriction
on refreshing recollection see Wismore
Evidence, 2nd Ed., see. 759,n.2.
19. Stai e. Rilcs, note 18 supra; Stai '.
Hinson (1921) 234 S. W. 832; igmore,
Evidence, 2nd Ed., section 765.
20. Stiffen v. Bauer, note 17, jupra;
Stai v. Rardolph, note 17 upra; Ludeig v.
Lyon (1880) 8 Mto. App. 567, "... he must
then have a memory of his own as to the
specific facts .... independent of the memo-
randa. Such memoranda are not evidence."
(memorandum opinion).
21. See the quotation in Clyer r. . C.
Rys. Co., note 17 supra.
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witness shows no lack of present memory, no memorandum is needed to
refresh his memory and none is permitted so far as Missouri cases go.2t
There is much controversy and disagreement as to whether the memo-
randum used in "refreshing the memory" should have been made at the time
of the transaction. Upon principle it should make no difference when the
memorandum was made so long as the memory is actually refreshed. The
error has arisen from confusing the rules of "past recollection recorded"
with "refreshing the memory" rules. This confusion is shown in Traber v.
Hicks,2 where the court said, among other things: "He has the right to
refresh his memory from written memoranda made at or near the time-."23
It certainly appears logical that one's mind can be refreshed as fairly, if
capable of being refreshed at all, by memoranda made one year after the
transaction as if made at the very minute. Human experience surely dictates
this reasoning. Some Missouri cases show that it is of no consequence that a
time has elapsed between the transaction and the making of the memoran-
dum. 24 Courts should be liberal in such situations by leaving much to dis-
cretion of the trial judge.2a
Must the witness have been the author or one who supervised the making
of the memorandum used to "refresh his memory"?26 Again there is diversity
of opinion, due to confusion of the present principle with the rules for "past
recollection recorded." Logically, it should make no difference who wrote
the memorandum so long as memory of witness is genuinely refreshed. The
Missouri cases are divided.7 Yet the weight of authority in Missouri favors
allowing the use of the memorandum regardless of who made it. Perhaps
much should be left to the discretion of the trial judge to determine. If it
appears that the memorandum is merely putting a story in the witness'
22. (1895) 131 Mo. 180, 32 S. W. 1145.
23. See also Gass v. United Rys. of St.
Louis, note 17 supra, "at the time". See also
Lumber Co. v. Realty Co. (1910) 150 Mo. App.
61, 130 S. W. 822.
24. Jfard v. Transfer & Storage Co.,
note 16, supra; Shepard v. People's Storage
& Transfer Co., note 11, supra (opinion not
clear as to date of event); see, also, XVein-
berger v. Insurance Co. (1913) 170 Mo. App.
266, 272, 156 S. W. 79.
25. State P. Riles, note 18,supra.
26. Eberson v. Investment Co., note 7,
supra, "If a witness has a recollection which
is either revived or refreshed by reading a
memorandum or document, it is immaterial
who made the document, or whether it was
made under the supervision, or even in the
presence of the witness. The essential fact
is that after looking at it, the witness has a
present memory of the facts." This is an
enlightening and wholesome view.
27. The following cases permitted memo-
randa to he used regardless of authorship:
Rose v. Rubling (1887) 24 Mo. App. 369
("a witness may use a memorandum to
refresh his memory, although it is not in
his own handwriting, or made by himself.
and although it may he a copy . . ."); Tandy
v. JJabsah Ry. Co. (1922) 236 S. W. 1086. In
Taussig v. Shields (1887) 26 Mo. App. 318.
and State v. .ble, note 18, supra, the wit-
nesses had something to do with the mak-
ing of the documents used to refresh recol-
lection. See the quotation in note 26, supra.
See also Lay v. Railroad (1911) 157 Mo.
App. 467, 138 S. W. 884. See also Cusack Co.
v. Refining Co. (1924) 261 S. W. I. c. 729.
The following cases refuse to recognize
the broad principle that authorship of memo-
randum is immaterial: Traber v. Hicks
(1895) 131 Mo. 180, 32 S. W. 1145; MKte-
leget v. Eckhard (1877) 4 Mo. App. 589
(memorandum opinion). In State v. Patton,
note 17, supra, court said, obiter, that witness
could not refresh his memory from papers
"of which he had no part in the making."
Court refused to follow Eberson v. Invetntt
Co. (see the quotation in note 26 supra) but
cited State v. Fannon (1900) 158 Mo. 149, 59
S. W. 75. In Stat v. Randolph, note 17,
supra, witness was not author of memoran-
dum. He was not allowed to refresh his
memory from it, but apparently on the
ground that it would he impossible to re-
fresh his memory under the circumstances,
rather than on the narrow ground of author-
ship.
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,mouth, certainly it should be refused, whoever made it, even if made by the
witness himself. Authorship ought to be merely one of the circumstances in
the case to be considered by the trial judge in determining whether refreshing
-of memory was genuine or artificial. Flexibility and liberality should govern.
That the memorandum is a copy and not an original should make no
difference whatsoever, since the true test is as to the actual refreshing.28
Hence the original should need no accounting for.-9 The opponent should be
allowed to have the memorandum to cross-examine and impeach.30
Now applying these principles to the case under review, it seems doubtful
whether the appellate court was correct in holding witness could use the
"time book" to "refresh his memory". Is it conceivable that a witness could
scan a memorandum of work done on various days ranging irregularly over a
period of time, differing in number of hours each, and then be able to say his
memory had been refreshed, there being some 365 hours? In fairness to human
intelligence, could a witness have his "memory refreshed" by a set of figures
such as these? It seems impossible. All he could do was to read this off to the
ocourt.3" He could not have remembered it even after a "refreshing." So as
indicated above, this memorandum was properly admitted as evidence to
go to the jury as "past recollection recorded"; but it seems erroneous to call it
"refreshing the memory." No harm was done in this case by calling the process
by the wrong name, since the memorandum was independently admissible.
But loose nomenclature leads to inevitable confusion in many cases.32
Courts often admit evidence of the character found in the case under re-
view without distinguishing these principles.n3 This has led to the adoption
of spurious limitations on "refreshing memory" borrowed from the principle
of "past recollection recorded", and also has led courts to call many cases
"refreshing memory" which are clearly "past recollection recorded." This
is further noticeable in dbd u. Sirimpie." This was an action to enforce
a mechanics lien for materials furnished consisting of "plumbing, sewering,
and gas-fitting" for a hotel. The price'of these materials was $3471.80.
Witness Honig was in charge of the material furnished and with the assistance
of the foreman, Kelley, made out "charging slips" of it. Honig and one Ger-
hard later compiled a memorandum of these slips. The memorandum was in
handwriting of Gerhard. At the trial Honig "refreshed his memory" from the
memorandum. The court said this was unobjectionable. But it issubmitted
that the court was confused here. Would it be possible for Honig to "refresh his
memory" concerning over three thousand dollars worth of materials in these
various items? Had Honig, Gerhard, and Kelley taken the stand in support
28. Horkaday v. Gilham (1920) 226 "Now in cases of an account composed of
S. W. 991; .Rose v. Rubeling, note 27, supra. many items, all this (refreshing memory)
Yfinn v. Modern lVoodmen (1911) 157 Mo. means nothing more than reading the book in
App. 1, 137 S. W. 292 asserts a discretion evidence. This we all know from daly e"per-
in the trial court. ionce in the trial courts. It is out of all reason
29. Gardner v. Springfield Gas & Electric to say that a merchant, or his clerks can
,Co. (1911) 154 Mo. App. 666, 135 S. W. 1023. recall each item of the account, and a fair-
30. Jbel v. Strimple, note 13, supra; minded witness will generally decline the
State v. Nardini (1916) 186 S. W. 557; attempt."
State v. Miller, note 18, supra. 32. Wigmore, Evidcnce, 2nd Ed. sec. 735.
31. Anchor Milling Co. v. lXalsh, note 3, 33. dnchor Milling Co. r. JfalhA, note
supra. After stating that a witness could 3,supra.
Tefresh his memory under certain circum- 34. Note 13, .rpra.
stances, the court used the following language:
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of the memorandum, we would have had a case of "composite past recollection
recorded." Honig and Kelley could have testified to the correctness of the
"charging slips" and Gerhard as to the correctness of the copy. Since the
"charging slips" were destroyed, the memorandum would have gone to the
jury as evidence.
In Shepard v. Peoples Storage and Transfer Co.35 the court is far from clear
as to what it really means. In that case there was an action for conversion of
household goods by the storage company. The court used the following
language: ...... a witness may refer to a memorandum to refresh his memory
and if he has no present memory of the facts, he may even read from the
memorandum ....... There were 24 articles listed, and it would hardly be
reasonable to require the witness to testify wholly from memory as to the
reasonable market value at that time (of conversion)." The court was probably
correct in saying that it would be impossible to testify from memory. But why
call it "refreshing the memory" at all? It is impossible for a witness to have
his memory refreshed as to complicated list of articles and values. Was it
not a clear case of "past recollection recorded"? When the witness showed no
ability to remember the various articles and values, she could have testified
to the correctness of the memorandum. Then the memorandum could have
gone in as evidence if it had been made while the event was "fairly fresh" in
her mind. This may serve to explain why the court said that the witness could
read from the memorandum. The court further said: "It is necessary in such
cases that the witness should be able to testify that the entry in writing was
made contemporaneous with the event, as was done in the case at bar, and
that at that time she knew the memorandum to be correct." This limitation
is applicable only to "past recollection recorded," and is not applicable to
"refreshing memory" cases either on precedent in Missouri,36 except in cases
of failure to appreciate the two separate situations,"7 or on principle as men-
tioned above.
In Lumber Co. v. Realty Co. 38 a witness, during inspection of a house
under construction, made a list of 55 items of materials furnished. At the
trial he apparently "refreshed his memory" from the memorandum. The
court did not disapprove of this, saying that he could not testify with certainty
without it. Probably, this decision could be more satisfactorily explained on
the basis of "past recollection recorded" unless the appellate court was unwill-
ing to say that the trial court abused its discretion in holding that one's
memory could be refreshed as to 55 items of materials. Perhaps this hesitation
caused the court in this case to throw around it the limitation that the memo-
randum was unobjectionable since it was made during the inspection of the
house.
35. Note11, supra. Robertson v. Reed (1889) 38 Mo. App. 32
36. See cases cited in note 24, supra: (theory of past recollection seems to be
alsoquotationinnote26,supra. ignored); Durnford v. Chicago B. & Q.
37. See cases cited in notes 22 and 23, R. Co. (1923) 246 S. W. 973. See also Ipotr-
tupra; also the quotation in note 31, supra. eide v. Kelley (1922) 243 S. W. 158.
38. Note23,supra. In Hockaday v. Gilham, note 28, supra,
39. The same confusion of principles is and Rose v. Rubeling, note 27, supra, It may
found in Third National Bank V. Owen (1890) be questioned whether the memoranda were
101 Mo. 558, 14 S. W. 632; Hoffman v. not too extensive for the witnesses to actually
K. C. Laundry Service Co. (1922) 243 S. IV. keep in their memories the various Items.
232 (may have been past recollection);
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Throughout the Missouri decisions there is this tendency to confuse the
two distinct principles of using the memorandum to "refresh the memory"
and using it as evidence. 9 It is a failure to disentangle distinct principles,
but a lumping them into the catch-all of "refreshing the memory". The case
under review unfortunately shows the same failing. It is hoped, however,
.that in the future the courts will recognize more consistently the two prin-
ciples involved and that the confusion due to loose nomenclature will be
avoided.
.. GwrAr FRY4o
PRACTICE-FUNCTION OF THE COURT AND JURY IN RE-
CEPTION OF A CONFESSION-State v. Parr., In the case cited above,
wherein the appellant was charged with murder, the prosecution offered a
statement made by a defendant containing certain incriminating facts. The
admissibility of this confession was contested and the testimony proved
conflicting as to whether it was made voluntarily. After hearing the prelimi-
nary evidence, the court admitted the confession, and passed the entire mass of
evidence on to the jury under the instruction that it might consider the whole
in determining what credence should be given to the confession or any part
of it. This procedure, the Missouri Supreme Court sustained as proper, in an
opinion by Walker, J.
The translation of Coke's maxim,%-all questions of fact are for the jury,
all questions of law are for the court-is an often quoted statement. But not
only is its application a difficult one, but its accuracy is questionable. It is
fundamental in the common law that the admissibility of a given piece of
evidence is for the court, though that question may entail the determination
of certain facts preliminary to admission. 3 The orthodox rule of procedure has
been that it is the court's function to rule on the admissibility of evidence, and
the jury's function to determine its credibility. Of course under this view, it is
perfectly proper for the court, after hearing all of the conflicting preliminary
evidence on the question of admissibility of a confession, to refer the entire
evidence to the jury. That body is then entitled to determine the credibility
to be given the confession upon considering the whole of the evidence sub-
mitted to it.
In a distinct line of decisions this method has appealed to the Missouri
Supreme Court as the proper course to pursue. As early as 1830, that body
in State v. Hectors decided: "Whether a confession issuffidiently free and volun-
tary to be competent testimony, is a matter of law to be decided by the court
and not by the jury." It also distinctly disapproved of the practice of leaving
the admissibility of a confession to a jury. In State o. Duncan$, the court
clearly adhered to the orthodox view when it said that the lower "court left it
to the jury to determine whether the confessions were voluntary or not, and
40. LL. B., University of Missouri, 12, 487, 861 and 2SSO; Phipson, Evidence
School of Law, 1925. (6th Ed.). 11. See also Thayer. Preliminary
Treatise, Ch. 5; 4 Harv. L. R. 147.
1. (1922) 296 Mo.406,246 S. W.903. 4. (1830) 2 Mo. 166, L e. 167, 22 Am.
2. "ad quaestionem faa! non respondent Dec. 454. 18 L. R. A. (n. s.) 777 (n) 1. c. 781.
judices; ad quaestionem juris nonresponden* 5. (1876) 64 Mo. 262,1. c. 265.18 L. R.A.
juratores." (n. s.) 777 (n) . c. 781.
3. WVigmore, Evidence (2nd Ed), sections
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in this the court committed an error." In State v. Hopkirko, Sherwood, J.,
held that the preliminary question of the admissability of confessions was
one which belonged to the court alone, and in State v. Brooks,7 the court in
dealing with a confession used the words: "It was for the court to say what
evidence should be received and for the jury to say what weight it should have
when received." During the period covered by the cases enumerated, not a
single Missouri decision that we have discovered suggests any rule of practice
other than the orthodox one.8
But recently a distinctly different practice has grown up in many courts
of this country by which some questions of admissibility are left to the jury.
Especially is that true with reference to the admission' of confessions. And
in State v. Moore,1o the Missouri Supreme Court apparently adopted this view
when it stated that the "admissibility of the confession in the case at bar was
the dominant question before the jury". There was a reversal because no
instruction was given to the jury on this subject. It is not now possible to
explain how the court arrived at a decision entirely opposed to the line of
decisions previously established. The reversal appears even more remarkable
when it is observed that the opinion in State v. Moore was written by Sherwood,
P. J., who had stated in State v. Hopkirk, supra, that the preliminary question
of the admissibility of confessions was one which belonged to the trial court.
It is doubtful whether Sherwood, J. in State v. Moore was influenced by this
recent trend to submit certain questions of admissibility to the jury, for he
does not refer to a single authority to sustain his conclusion.
Beginning with the opinion in State v. Moore, the authorities in Missouri
on the respective functions of the court and jury in handling a confession are
in a very unsatisfactory condition. State v. Brennan," in which the opinion
wasby Gantt,J.,turned the Missouri Supreme Court back toitsoriginal position,
holding that the lower court properly refused an institution that before the
jury should consider a confession, it must be satisfied that such confession was
voluntarily made, because such an instruction would indicate to the jury that
it could disregard the confession entirely even though admitted by the court.
In arriving at the conclusion, Gantt, J., clearly analyzes the situation, stating:
"The admissibility and competency of evidence is one thing, its credibility
another. It is the province of the court to determine in the first instance the
competency of the evidence offered, but it is the function of the jury * * * to
pass finally upon its weight and credibility." Then followed State v. Jones'
which, though it recognizes that it is proper for the trial court to make a
preliminary investigation before admitting a confession, states: "The court
properly required that all the circumstances attending the confession should
6. (1884) 84 Mo. 278. Am. St. Rep. 380; People v. Barke, (1886)
7. (1887) 92 Mo. 542, 1. €. 577, 5 S. W. 60 Mich. 277, 27 N. W. 539, I Am. St. Rep.
257,330. 501; People v. Braisch (1908) 193 N. Y. 46;
8. See also, for cases holding similarly: 85 N. E. 809; Comm. v. Epps (1899) 193
State v. Paurion (1881) 73 Mo. 695, 1. c. Pa. St. 512,44 Ad. 570; State v. Rogers (1914)
706; State v. Kinder (1888) 96 Mo. 548, 10 99 S. C. 504, 83 S. E. 971; Corez v. State
S. W. 77; State v. McKenzie (1898) 144 Mo. (1902) 43 Tex. Cr. Rep. 275, 66 S. W. 453.
40,45S. W. 1117. 10. (1900) 160 Mo. 443, 1. c. 460, 61
9. U. S. v. Oppenheim (1915) 228 Fed. S. W. 199.
220, s. c. (1917) 241 Fed. 625, 154 C. C. A. 11. (1901) 164 Mo. 487, 1. C. 510, 65
383; Martinez v. People (1913) 55 Colo. 51, S. W. 325.
132 Pac. 64, Ann. Cases 1914 C 559; State 12. (1902) 171 Mo. 401, 71 S. W. 680,
v. Storms (1901) 113 In. 385, 85 N. W. 610,86 94 Am. St. Rep. 786.
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be proven to the jury, and then submitted the question along with all these
facts to the jury, and required them to find whether the defendant made the
confession voluntarily." This statement by Gantt, P. J., is capable of being
misunderstood. If it be understood as meaning that the jury were to determine
whether the confession was "voluntary" in order to determine the credence to
be given the confession, then the statement accords with the decision by the
same judge in State v. Brennan, supra. If, however, Gantt, P. J., meant that
the jury were to determine the issue of voluntariness in order to determine
whether the confession was admissible as an item of evidence, then Gantt,
P. J., was not consistent with Gantt, J.
In State v. Stebbins,13 the instruction to the jury on the subject of the
defendant's confession can hardly be said to follow the earlier Missouri rule.
It appears to state to the jury that the confession is to be considered by it if
it first concludes that it was "freely and voluntarily made." The opinion is by
Gantt, J., who seems to have become confused in attempting to reconcile
State V. Moore, supra, with the earlier Missouri decisions. The curious point in
State v. Stebbins is, that the instruction was given at the request of the prosecu-
tion. Defendant remained unsatisfied. The court decided that the instruction
"was all that could be desired by the defendant." According to the orthodox
rule, defendant was not entitled to as much as he got.1' Since then, this same
erroneous instruction has crept into other cases.u5 There is a dictum of doubt-
ful import in State v. Simenson xs and the opinion in State v. Thomasn7 is
badly confused.
Such are the authorities in Missouri on the subjectig until the case under
review, State v. Parr, in which the court apparently fell in line with the ortho-
dox practice again. The Supreme Court of Missouri, once clearly an adherent
of the orthodox doctrine, since the case of State v. Moore presents a rather
uncertain line of authority. It is doubtful whether the court considers the
admissibility of a confession a question for the court or for the court and then
in turn for thejury. If the Supreme Court of Missouri has professed a tendency
to relegate the derermination of the admissibility of a confession to the jury,
what is to prevent it from extending the jury's powers to rulings on the ad-
missibility of other items of evidence? That very step has .been taken in
other states.19 Such a possibility wirrants a thorough investigation of the
consequences of such a substantial change in the practice of this state.
13. (1905) 188 Afo. 387, 87 S. W. 460.
Mir. WVigmore states that this decision "faces
both ways". Wigmore, Evidence (2nd Ed.),
sec. 861, n. 3.
14. Stater. Duncan, note5, supra.
15. State v. Brooks (1909) 220 Mo. 74,
119 S. W. 353; State v. lJansong (1917)
271 Mo. 50, 195 S. W. 999.
16. (1914) 263 Mo. 264, 172 S. W. 601.
17. (1913) 250 Mfo. 189, L c. 215, 157
S. W. 330.
18. With the possible exception of a
doubtful dictum in State v. Ellis (1922) 294
Mo. 269, 242 S. W. 952.
19. Hanford Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds
(1877) 36 Mlich 502 (the jury to disregard
certain communications if they believed a
confidential relationship existed); King
a. Hanson (1904) 13 N. D. 85, 99 N. W. 10S
(a privileged letter;, authenticity denied;
left to the jury to decide authenticity). Many
cases express the opinion that the jury alto is
to decide whether a statement submitted as
a dying declaration is admissible: Peotfi r.
Thompson (1905) 14S Cal. 717, 79 Pae. 435;
Jackson v. State (1876) 56 G2. 235; Comm. r.
Brt-e-r (1895) 164 Mass. 577, 42 N. E. 92;
State v. Scott (1914) 37 Nev. 412, 142 Pa.
1053; State . iango (1907) 75 N. J. L. 284.
68 AtL 125; ef. State r. aonic (1905)
74 N. 3. IL 522, 64 AtL 1016 and State r.
Leo (1910) 80 N. J. L 21, 77 AtL 523.
Compare the following Missouri cases
stating the orthodox rule as to admissibility
of dying declarations: State v. Sexton (1898)
147 Mo. 89,48 S. W. 4S2; State v. Zorn (1906)
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It is believed that the orthodox practice is the better one. Already the
jury system gives evidence of breaking down, of being unsuitable to our
highly specialized urban life. We should not place more burdens upon it.
It is enough to ask of the jury that it pass upon the credibility of the evidence
and not upon its admissibility. Otherwise, there is too much danger of confu-
sion. Nor is there any necessity for any further self-abnegation upon the
part of American courts. There is no magic about a jury. Jurors are not
trained in the difficult function of deciding contested issues. Much less are
they able to properly separate in their minds the distinct problems of first
determining admissibility and then in turn credibility.
R. C. CODURN20
202 Mo. 12, 100 S. W. S91; Stafe v. Thomas Wigniore, Evidence, 2nd. ed. sec. 14S1.
(1915) 180 S. W. 886; cf. State v. Crone 20. LL. B. 1925, University of Missouri
(1907) 209 Mo. 316, 108 S. W. 555. See, also, School of Law.
